Since unconditionally secure quantum two-party computations are known to be impossible, most existing quantum private comparison (QPC) protocols adopted a third party. Recently, we proposed a QPC protocol which involves two parties only, and showed that although it is not unconditionally secure, it only leaks an extremely small amount of information to the other party. Here we further propose the device-independent version of the protocol, so that it can be more convenient and dependable in practical applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-independent (DI) quantum cryptography has caught great interests recently [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . It aims to replace the model of the physical devices used in cryptographic protocols with physically testable assumptions, e.g., the certification of nonlocality. Thus the devices can be treated as black boxes that produce outputs correlated with some inputs. This brings the advantage that the assumptions needed to guarantee the security of the protocol can be significantly reduced, so that the knowledge of the internal workings of the devices is not required. The protocol remains reliable even if the devices are provided by the adversary. Such a higher degree of security makes DI protocols more dependable in practical applications than traditional quantum cryptography.
Currently, most existing DI protocols focused on quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] and related tasks [8] , where all legitimate participants always collaborate honestly against the attack of external cheaters. On the other hand, as pointed out in Ref. [9] , DI two-party cryptography remains a largely unexplored territory, as very few researches were dedicated to multi-party secure computation problems, where the legitimate participants do not trust each other since some of them may cheat. To our best knowledge, Refs. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] are the only references on this field so far, which studied quantum bit commitment, quantum coin tossing, weak string erasure, and position verification.
In this paper, we will take the first step towards the DI solution of another multi-party secure computation problem -quantum private comparison (QPC), a.k.a. the socialist millionaire problem [16] . The goal of QPC is to compare two secret numbers a and b of two parties Alice and Bob, respectively, so that they finally learn whether a and b are equal, without revealing any extra information on their values (other than what can be inferred from the comparison result) to the other party. As a typical example of multi-party secure computations, QPC plays essential roles in cryptography, with many applications * Electronic address: hegp@mail.sysu.edu.cn in e-commerce and data mining.
As it is well-known, unconditionally secure quantum two-party secure computations are impossible [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] , i.e., the dishonest party can always obtain a non-trivial amount of information on the secret data of the other party. QPC is also covered. To circumvent the problem, almost all existing QPC protocols ( [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] and the references therein) added a third party to help Alice and Bob accomplish the comparison. The protocol in Ref. [40] is a rare exception, in which such a third party is absent. But it was later found to be completely insecure [41, 42] because the entire secret data of the honest party will always be exposed to the other party.
Very recently, we proposed a device-dependent (DD) QPC protocol which involves two parties only [43] , and showed that the average amount of information leaked to the dishonest party can be as low as 14 bits for any length of the bit-string being compared. Therefore, despite that the protocol is not unconditionally secure, the performance is quite good, and this is achieved without relying on the third party. Here we will further upgrade the protocol to the device-independent (DI) version, so that it can enjoy even better security and versatility in practical applications.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, our previous DD protocol will be briefly reviewed. Then in section 3, it will be turned into the DI version, with its security analyzed in section 4.
II. THE DD PROTOCOL
Let H(x) be a classical hash function which is a 1-to-1 mapping between the n-bit strings x and y = H(x) (i.e., H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n ). Denote the two orthogonal states of a qubit as |0 0 and |1 0 , respectively, and define
That is, the subscript σ = 0, 1 in |γ σ stands for two incompatible measurement bases, while γ = 0, 1 distinguishes the two states in the same basis. In Ref. [43] , the following protocol was proposed.
The DD QPC Protocol (for comparing Alice's n-bit string a ≡ a 1 a 2 ...a n and Bob's n-bit
(1) Using the hash function H(x), Alice calculates the n-bit string h Note that in the protocol, we compare the hash functions h A and h B instead of the secret strings a and b themselves. The purpose is to change the information leaked to the other party from direct information into mutual information on a and b. It will not change the total amount of information leaked.
III. THE DI PROTOCOL
In each round of step (2) of the above protocol, h 
She keeps the first qubit and sends Bob the second one. Then they measure their qubits in the h , their results will be different with probability 1/2. Thus the resultant protocol is equivalent to our original DD protocol.
In DI cryptography, Bell states can further be replaced by pairs of devices called nonlocal boxes, which can be supplied by either Alice or Bob, or even other untrusty parties. These devices can be treated as DI black boxes that take inputs and produce outputs, without the need nor the possibility to check how they work internally. Each of Alice's (Bob's) boxes has four inputs S (0)
A , and S (3)
B , and S (3) B ). For each input, Alice's (Bob's) box can product either of the two outputs γ
When the boxes are manufactured honestly, they should act exactly like |Φ + . For example, if we treat |0 0 and |1 0 (|0 1 and |1 1 ) as the eigenstates of the Pauli operator σ z (σ x ), then an honest implementation of such a DI box pair can be realized using the Bell state |Φ + itself, with the inputs of the box at Alice's or Bob's side being implemented with the measurements on her or his qubit, respectively, as [13] 
Define the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) polynomials [3]
(2) and
where the correlator γ
is defined as the probability Pr(γ
. If the boxes work as they were claimed, then the CHSH values should reach the point of maximal quantum violation of the CHSH Bell inequality, i.e., C 1 = C 2 = 2 √ 2. Also, when Alice and Bob choose the same input S (0) (or S (1) ) for a pair of the boxes, they should always obtain maximally correlated outputs γ
B ). On the contrary, for local boxes which have fixed output values without displaying any nonlocal correlation, the CHSH values will satisfy the CHSH Bell inequality C 1 ≤ 2 and
Also, like other DI cryptographic protocols (e.g., [2, 3, 5] ), it is assumed that Alice's and Bob's locations are secure, in the sense that no unwanted information can leak out to the outside. Thus one party cannot know the other's inputs and outputs to the DI boxes, unless the latter party announces them.
With such nonlocal boxes, our protocol can be turned into the following DI version.
The DI QPC Protocol (for comparing Alice's n-bit string a ≡ a 1 a 2 ...a n and Bob's n-bit
(A) The check mode: Alice and Bob share many pairs of DI boxes and check them as follows.
(i) Alice randomly chooses some of them, asking Bob to randomly pick inputs into his boxes and announce both his inputs and outputs, then she randomly picks inputs into her boxes and records the outputs.
(ii) Bob randomly chooses another portion of the box pairs, asking Alice to randomly pick inputs into her boxes and announce both her inputs and outputs, then he randomly picks inputs into his boxes and records the outputs.
In both (i) and (ii), each of them check whether they have correlated outputs when they picked the same inputs S (0) or S (1) for the boxes of the same pair, and use the outputs they obtained when picking different inputs to check whether the CHSH values C 1 and C 2 violate the CHSH Bell inequality.
(B) The compare mode: Alice and Bob randomly pick some of the rest unchecked pairs of boxes to continue with the following steps.
(1) Using the hash function H(x), Alice calculates the n-bit string h
, and Bob calculates the n-bit string h B ≡ h For clarity, in the above description we wrote the check mode and the compare mode separately. But for better security, the two modes should actually be mixed together. That is, Alice and Bob choose some DI boxes to run the check mode first, and they choose one of the unchecked DI box and shift to the compare mode to compare one bit of h A and h B . Then they choose some other DI boxes and run the check mode again, followed by another round of the compare mode to compare the next bit of h A and h B , and so on. The times for shifting modes are decided randomly by both parties in turns. Otherwise, if the compare mode is run only after the check mode is completed, the provider of the DI boxes may cheat by building a secret timer into each box, so that they all act honestly like the entangled state |Φ + during the check mode, then switch to some kinds of cheating mode (e.g., giving fixed outputs regardless the input values) automatically at the time when the compare mode is expected to begin. Also, it is important that in step (2.1A) (step (2.1B)), Alice (Bob) should finish input to her (his) box and record the output before telling the other party which box is picked. Otherwise, if she (he) announces which box is picked first, and postpone the input/output process to step (2.3) after the other party completed the input/output in step (2.2), then it could also bring security problems. That is, if the other party is dishonest and he provides the DI boxes, he may build a remote control into each box, so that they usually act like real nonlocal boxes that can certainly pass the CHSH inequality check. But when he knows which box is picked for the compare mode, he engages the remote control to turn the box into the cheating mode which gives a fixed output that known to himself beforehand, so that he can cheat with the method that we will describe below in the paragraph before Theorem 1.
IV. SECURITY
Since unconditionally secure QPC is impossible when only two parties are involved, we does not attempt to make the information leaked in our protocol arbitrarily close to 0. Instead, our goal is merely to make it stay at a low level. That is, the cheating we are going to deal with is how the dishonest Alice/Bob tries to increase his/her information on the other's secret data.
There is surely no security problem to consider when a = b, because both parties naturally know the secret data of each other from the comparison result. Now let us study the case when the protocol outputs a = b.
An important feature of our protocol is that, if it aborts after running m (1 ≤ m ≤ n) rounds of step (2), the last n − m bits of h A and h B will not be compared any more. They will not be input into the DI boxes, or enter the protocol in any other form at all. Thus it is obvious that these bits remain completely secret to the other party. As a consequence, the amount of mutual information leaked to each party is m bits at the most.
Therefore, the goal of a dishonest party is to increase m. To do so, he/she has to make the protocol abort as late as possible. Without loss of generality, let us assume that Alice cheats, and suppose that she prepares and supplies all the DI boxes, which is a case that benefits her the most so that we can obtain a general upper bound of the successful cheating probability.
It is easy for Alice to cheat in each of the odd rounds, because in step (2.3A) she can always announce γ
. This ensures that the protocol will never abort at these rounds.
But in each of the rest k ≡ m/2 even rounds among the first m rounds of step (2), she is required to announce
in step (2.3B). Since she wishes to announce a value that satisfies
so that the protocol will not abort, she needs to guess the γ
value that Bob will obtain from his DI box. Now let us prove that the probability p guess for her to make a correct guess cannot equal exactly to 1. B , then they cannot pass the CHSH inequality check.
Proof. Recall that step (ii) of the check mode requires Alice to announce both her inputs and outputs to a DI box when Bob has not input anything into his corresponding box yet. Therefore, for these boxes, Alice cannot monitor Bob's announced values of his γ A 's and γ
(3)
A 's to make them pass the CHSH inequality check. Consequently, if all boxes give γ (0)
B , there will be γ
Substituting them into Eq. (2), we immediately obtain
which is far below the correct expected value 2 √ 2. Consequently, when Bob checks the C 1 value given by the boxes picked in step (ii), he will catch Alice cheating. This ends the proof.
Of course, dishonest Alice does not have to make all of Bob's DI boxes always give the same output γ
She can mix a small number of such boxes with real nonlocal boxes (i.e., these act exactly like |Φ + ). With this method, the corresponding CHSH value C 1 may merely deviate slightly from 2 √ 2, so that the cheating could be covered by statistical fluctuation. But then it is obvious that once Bob randomly picks a box in step (2.1B), this box does not necessarily be one of these which give fixed output γ with certainty before Bob announces it. Thus Theorem 1 leads us to the following conclusion.
Corollary. In step (2.2B), the probability p guess for dishonest Alice to make a correct guess on the output value γ that Bob will announce in step (2.3B) cannot equal to 1.
In this case, the upper bound of the average amount of information on Bob's secret data b that leaked to Alice is calculated as follows. Continue with the analysis before Theorem 1. As Alice has probability p guess to make a correct guess on Bob's γ
in step (2.2B), so that in each of the first k even rounds there is probability p guess that the protocol will not abort. Consequently, the probability for the protocol to abort at the mth round (i.e., it happens to continue for the first k − 1 even rounds while aborts at the k-th even round) is
That is, with probability p m abort the protocol will abort at the mth round, and dishonest Alice will know nothing about the rest n − m bits of Bob's hash value, so that she learns m bits of information at the most. Also, with probability p
guess the protocol does not aborts until all bits are compared (here [n/2] means the integer part of n/2). In this case she learns all the n bits. Summing over all possible m values and recall that m = 2k (as the protocol will not abort at the odd rounds when Alice cheats), the average amount of mutual information leaked to dishonest Alice is bounded by
guess . (6) Note that this is merely a upper bound, as we have not considered the cases where dishonest Alice cannot even escape the detection in the check mode. That is, Alice may reach this bound only if her DI boxes can pass the check mode with the maximum probability 1.
When taking into consideration the probability for Alice to pass the check mode, the maximum value of p guess will also be bounded. But calculating the exact bound could be complicated, because the CHSH values are merely statistical results. In practice we cannot expect to find C 1 = C 2 = 2 √ 2 exactly. Some statistical fluctuation has to be allowed. Noise and manufacture imperfections of the experimental devices could also affected the actual outcome of the CHSH values. Thus it is hard to obtain a general result without knowing the specific performance of the experimental devices used for the implementation of the protocol. Here, take for example, let us follow Ref. [6] to take C 1 , C 2 ≥ 2.5 as acceptable values, and neglect the noise and device imperfections. In this case, suppose that Alice prepares 61% of the DI boxes as real nonlocal boxes (which have the theoretical expected values C 1 = C 2 = 2 √ 2), while the rest 39% boxes are prepared as local boxes which will produce fixed output values known beforehand to herself regardless Bob's input (which have C 1 = C 2 = 2). Then the theoretical expected average CHSH values will be 61% × 2 √ 2 + 39% × 2 ≃ 2.505, so that she stands a 5) of Ref. [43] , the maximum probability for her to guess Bob's output is p max = cos 2 (π/8) ≃ 0.8536. In this case we have
In Fig.1 we take p guess = 0.91 and show the probability for the protocol to abort at exactly the mth round (i.e., p m abort in Eq. (5)) when Alice cheats. We can see that most of the time the protocol will abort very soon. Thus the corresponding amount of information leaked will be small. The cases that the protocol can last many rounds will occur with extremely small probabilities only. Therefore, there is very low chances that dishonest Alice can gain a large amount of information on Bob's secret data. Fig. 2 shows the average amount of information leaked to Alice (i.e., I A in Eq. (6)) as a function of the length n of the bit-strings a and b being compared. We can see that I A never excesses 23 bits for any length n of a and b when p guess = 0.91. It is a little higher than that of the DD version, whose upper bound of the amount of information leaked to Alice is 14 bits, as proven in Ref. [43] . This is because in the DI protocol, 39% of the DI boxes can be local boxes which give fixed outputs, so that dishonest Alice's p guess can go beyond the p max in the DD version. But we should note that both 23 bits (for the DI protocol) and 14 bits (for the DD protocol) are merely loose upper bounds. This is because, as elaborated in Ref. [43] , when dishonest Alice saturates the maximum probability p max for guessing Bob's output γ with probability 1. Thus she cannot gain exactly m bits of information on h B (and therefore Bob's string b) when the protocol aborts in the mth round of step (2) . The same thing is also true for the local boxes. That is, while they can enable Alice to guess Bob's output γ worth studying what will be the tight upper bounds of the information leaked in both the DD and DI protocols.
For illustration purposes, in Fig. 2 we also plotted I A as a function of n when p guess = 0.99. It shows that I A never excesses 200 bits for any length n even for such a high p guess value. Considering that most data we use in real applications nowadays are generally at the size of megabytes to gigabytes, leaking only 200 bits is not serious at all. We would also like to emphasize that there is no known method to create DI boxes which can pass the CHSH test with a nontrivial probability while reaching p guess = 0.99 simultaneously. But even if such "black magic" exists, our result shows that the security level of the DI QPC protocol is still quite acceptable.
From the symmetry of the protocol, it is trivial to show that the same conclusion also applies if Bob (instead of Alice) cheats.
V. SUMMARY
Thus we showed that although our DI QPC protocol is not unconditionally secure, the average of the amount of information leaked to the dishonest party is very low, and it has a fixed upper bound for any length of the secret strings being compared. Also, the elimination of the third party surely enhances the convenience for the practical applications of QPC.
This result also serves as yet another example that twoparty cryptography can enjoy the advantage of the DI scenario too, so that its security can be even more reliable than their DD counterparts. It is also interesting to study in future works whether the method can be applied to quantum private query (QPQ) [44] [45] [46] , which is another kind of multi-party secure computation protocols that became a hot topic recently due to its great practical significance.
